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ABSTRACT
In the first part of this paper, we discuss the properties of a second order
flexible system of preferences based on demand equations which are linear in
income and quadratic in prices for all goods but one. Hausman and Ruud (AER,
1984) introduced a family labor supply model based on this system. We derive
explicit expressions for the corresponding direct utility function,
conditional demand equations, and concavity conditions in both price~income
and quantity space. These results are then used in an empirical static femily
labor supply model, in which kinked budget constraints and unemployment
benefits are taken into account for both spouses. Imposition of concavity is
necessary for consistent estimation and the concavity constraint appears to be
binding. For females, we find a strongly forward bending labor supply
function and a strong impact of the tax system. For males, the own wage
elasticity appears to be small and negative. For both spouses, we find small
cross-wage elasticities in the unconditional labor supply equations and,
correspondingly, small elasticities with respect Lo the partner's working
hours in the conditional labor supply equation.i
1. Introduction
The larger part of the recent labor supply literature is devoted to
the explanation of female labor supply decisions, thereby addressing the theo-
retical and econometric problems associated with non-participation, non-linear
and non-convex budget sets and stochastic specification (see, for example
Heckman (1974), Hausman (1979, 1980, 1985), Moffitt (1986), Arrufat and
Zabalza (1986). Blundell and Meghir (1986) and Blundell, Ham and Meghir
(1987)). In these papers, male labor supply decisions usually play a role only
through a(by assumption exogenous) explanatory variable other household
income, which includes male labor earnings.
In this paper we adopt the more general approach of modelling male and
female labor supply simultaneously. First of all, there is some evidence that
the exogeneity assumption of 'other household income' in female labor supply
models is not always tenable; see Smith and Blundell (1986). More importantly,
male and female labor supply decisions within a household are likely to be
fundamentnlly interrelated and a full understanding of household's Iabor sup-
ply behavior requires to take this ínterrelationship into account in setting
up the empirical model.
The joint modelling of male and female labor supply creates some
specific problems in addition to those encountered in modelling individual
labor supply. One of the issues is how to represent the householcj members'
preferences. We will follow the usual approach of assuming that preferences
can be represented by a joint household utility function with male leísure,
female leisure and total household consumption as arguments. There have been
some attempts to develop more general procedures, in which the spouses are
allowed to have different preferences and household behavior is the outcome of
a game. In order to derive demand functions one then has to specify a certain
concept of equilibrium (see Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney
(1981), for example). However valuable this approach may be from a theoretical
point of view, its empirical implementation has not (yet) been very succesful,
the main reason being that the available data do usuelly not allow to identify
both utility functions, and to infer which equilibrium concept is appropriate.
A second issue that comes up specifically in modelling joint male and
female labor supply is that one ususlly also has to derive conditional supply
equations, i.e. equations that give optimal labor supply of a household mem-
ber, given a fixed number of hours of labor supply by the partner. For exam-
ple, if the female partner stops working, the functional form of the malez
labor supply equation changes from its unconditional to its
(assuming absence of other quantity constraints). For
functional forms (in the sense of Diewert (19~4)), such as
Demand 5ystem and the Indirect Translog, the derivation of
equations is a cumbersome affair, and closed forms can
obtained. See, for example, Kooreman and Kapteyn (1986).









suited to deal with conditional equations and unconditional equations in a
relatively tractable way. The first one is the direct quadratic utility
function, which was used for this kind of problem by Wales and Woodland (1980)
and later on extensively by Ransom (198~a,198~b). The main disadvantage of
this system is the existence of a satiation point, which limits the area in
quantity space that can be described by the system. In the case of random
preferences, it means that the range of the stochastic parameters has to be
restricted. This point will be discussed in slightly more detail in the
concluding section. Except for this one complication the dírect quadratic
utility function is a convenient specification. Yet it seems worthwhile to
investigate alternatives, if only for the reason that empirical demand systems
are not necessarily described well by the quadratic specification. A second
flexible system with reasonable tractability has been introduced by Hausman
and Ruud (1984).
Since the properties of the Hausman-Ruud system have not been
discussed in the literature extensively, we provide a rather elaborate
analysis of the system, including the derívation of the conditional supply
equations, the computation of direct utility and the imposition of concavity
in wages of the cost function. The need to compute direct utility in an
arbitrary point of the choice set may arise if the budget set is non-convex in
which case different local utility maxima on convex subsets of the budget set
have to be compared. Imposition of concavity in a relevant range of wages is
sometimes necessary in empirical applications, as the likelihood function of
the model may not be well-defined if concavity is not satisfied.
The practical importance of these issues will be illustrated in an
empirical example given in Section 4. In Section 5 we make a brief comparison
between the direct qudratic and the Hausman-Ruud. There we also discuss the
importance of modelling the labor supply of spouses jointly.3
2.1. The model
A household is assumed to maximize a utility function with male lei-
sure, female leisure and total household consumption as its arguments. We
assume that the expenditure function in real terms (i .e. expenditures divided
by the price of consumption) corresponding to maximization of the utility
function under a linear full income constraint is of the Gorman polar form
type introduced by Hausman and Ruud (1984):
c(w,u) - u exp(-~'w) -{3 i b'w t 2 w'Aw},
where w-(wm,wf)' : the husband's and wife's after tax real wage rates;
u : household utility level;
a 1 p b
A-(~m I, p- f ml, b - ml and 9: parameters.
Iloc ~rf J IIRfJ b fJ
The corresponding indirect utility function is given by
v(w.u) - u"exP(P'w). u" - g. u t b'w t2 w'Aw, (1)
where u denotes the household's real non-labor income. u" can be interpreted
as the difference (in real terms) between non-labor income and the
expenditures needed to reach utility level 0.
Application of Roy's identity yields the following labor supply
functions:
h" - b. u"g t Aw, (2)
where h"-(hm, hf)' is the vector of optimal numbers of working hours of
husband and wife respectively.
2.2. Concavity
The use of the function given by (1) is limited by the usual regulari-
ty conditions on expenditure functions. For this specification, only concavity
has to be considered, i.e. the matrix of second order partial derivatives of
the expenditure function m~ist be negative semi-definite and of rank 2;
homogeneity and monotonicity with respect to u are satisfied automatically.
It is easy to show, that concavity is equivalent to4
B ~ H'pp' - A is negative definitel)
From now on we assume that the matrix A is non-singular.




If g~0 and S'A-1~6-G, then B is negative definite for no value of H~. This case
is excluded from now on. In the special case that A is positive definite, it
is easy to prove that (3') is not only necessary but also sufficient for (3).
(See, for a proof of a more general result, Bekker (1986)).
The application of duality theory strongly hinges on the concavity
condition; without this property, there is no utility maximizing problem be-
hind the labor supply equations. Therefore, (3) must hold for all relevant
(w,H), including shadow wages and corresponding virtual incomes.
2.3. The Direct Utility function
Non-convexity of the budget set makes it necessary to compare the
values of the direct utility function in different points. We shall derive the
direct utility function by calculating the utility level in some arbitrary
point (hm,hf,y), where y is the household's consumption (or income):
Y- H t w h i wf,hf (4)
m m
Let k be the vector h-b, where h-(hm,hf)'. Given (hm,hf,y), we first seek
(shadow-)wages w and corresponding non-labor income H satisfying
k - H~~ . Aw
H' - H t 8 t w' b t 2w' Aw





1) B is just the Hessian of the expenditure function. Since the expenditure
function is defined in terms of real wage rates, the ususal condition that the
Hessian of the expenditure function is negative semi-definite, is replaced by
(3).5
Inserting the solution (w,x) from (5), (6) and (~) in the indirect utility
function (1) then yields the utility level at (hm,hf,y).
Equations (5) through (~) yield, after substituting (~) into (6):
w - A-lk - -xMA 1R
xM- 2(w - A-lk)'A(w -
A-lk) - 2k,A-1k f Y t 8
Substituting (8) into (9) Yields a quadratic equation in x~:
2xN2R'A-1P - x~ - 2k'A-lk t y t 8- 0
and if x~ is known, w can be found from (8}:
w - A-1(k - x~~)
Thus (w,x) can be determined iff (10) has a real solution, i.é. iff





a solution (w,x) is only feasible if it satisfies concavity condition (3).
Obviously, if s-0, the solution of (10) and (11) is unique and it satisfies
(3) if and only if A is positive definite. If g~0 end (12) holds, then (10)
and (11) yield (at most) two solutions (w,x~) and only the smallest of the two
satisfies the necessary condition (3'):
xM - (P'A-1R)-1- {(R'A-1P)-2' (A'A-1P)-1Lk'A-lk - 2(y . 8)~}1~2 (13a)
w - A-1(k - x~P) (13b)
x - Y - w'h (13c)
If this solution satisfies (3), then it is feasible and the utility level is
given by
U(hm.hf.Y) - V(wm.wf.x) - x~ exP(P'w) (14)6
The reader should be aware of the relation between invertibility (i.e.
the question whether ( wm,wf,H) can be solved as a function of (hm,hf,y)) and
concavity ( i.e. well-behavior of the direct or indirect utility function). As
usual in dually specified systems, the concavity condition involves ( shadow-)
wages and i t can therefore only be checked in (hm,hf,y)-space if invertibility
is guaranteed. In the special case of a positive definite matrix A, a specific
property of the specification used is the fact that, i f (wm,wf,H) cen be
found, then exactly one solution satisfies the concavity conditions (i.e.:
"invertibility gvarantees concavity").
2.4. Rationed labor supply
In this subsection, we derive rationed labor supply functions, i.e.
labor supply for one individual if - for some reason - the partner's number of
working hours is fixed. This means, that the household maximizes utility,
taking into account some binding constraint on one of the three goods.
Rationed supply curves can be determined using shadow-wages and sha-
dow-income ( see Neary 8~ Roberts (1980)).2) We derive the female's rationed
labor supply hf for given hm, actusl real wage rates wm and wf and real non-
labor income u. (The male's rationed labor supply can be derived in exactly
the same way)
We search for a shadow wage rate wm and corresponding H, such that
hm - mH~ r ymwm t awf . bm
H a h w - H t h w m m m m





If e feasible solution ( wm,u) (with corresponding x) is found, optimal female
labor supply is given by
-w
hf - Hi.H . yfwf ~ awm i bf (16)
-------------------------------------------------------
2) Rationed supply curves can alternatively be determined using first order
conditions for maximization of the direct utility function, which is
explicitly derived in section 2.3, subject to the budget constraint and the
ration levels.The system (15) implies
where
a2wmF alwmt s0- 0
a0- -hm4 Sm{K . g. hmwm. bfwf. 2yfwf} t oewf. bm.
a1- ym' pm{-hmt bmi awf},
1
a2- Z~mym.
If (1~) has no real solution, no shadow wage can be found and hf cannot be
determined. Fquation (1~) has a real solution iff
D~ Rm(-hm. bmt awf)2t ám- 2~Bm~rm{hmwm. u i g t bfwft Z~rfwf} ~ 0 (18)
-M
If wm is found, then u, u and hf follow immediately from (15) and (16).
The solution is feasible iff it satisfies concavity condition (3).
We focus on the "regular" case, i.e. ~mym
If (18) holds, the solutions for wm are given by
~ 0.
wm - -Rml ~ (hm - bm - awf)IXf ' (gmà'm)-1 f.
w
The r.orresponding val.ue of u is
-w
H - m2ám } (3m ~ (19)
Since the matrix m2YmpR'-A is indefinite or semi-definite and the matrix pS'
is positive semi-definite, it is easy to see that only one solution can be
Feasible:
wm- -laml. ( hm- bm- ~wf)Iáf t (smYm)-1~. (20)
Note that, even in the special case of a positive defínite matrix A, this
solution is not necessarily feasible: condition (3) should always be checked.
Thus, the relation between "partial invertibility" and concavity is different8
from the relation between "full invertibility" and concavity, which was
discussed in Section 2.3.
In this section we derived the conditional female labor supply
function hf(wf,hm,utmhm) corresponding to household preferences given by
(14). The result is a closed form expression for hf. Lundberg (1988) follows a
different strategy: She starts with conditional demand functions in some
convenient form and dces not discuss the issue whether it is possible to find
a household utility function corresponding to these equations. Our approach
has the advantage that, since a closed form expression of the indirect utility
function is available, it is easy to check whether the underlying system of
preferences satisfies regularity properties (e.g. concavity) end allows for
the use of non-convex budget sets.
3. Ap~l i-cations
The rationed labor supply functions derived in Section 2.4 can be
applied in several situations. The most common example is the nonnegativity
constraint for females. If this restriction is binding, the husband's labor
supply function should be replaced by a rationed labor supply function, as
described in Section 2.4. The same argument holds for the analysis of
implications of mandatory reduction of the working week, as proposed by some
Western European governments, on labor supply of individuals for whose partner
this reduction is binding.
A similar situation arises if individual budget sets are piecewise
linear and convex (see e.g., Blomquist (1983) and Hausman (19~9)), es in the
case where spouses file separately and the tax system is progressive and
piecewise linear. The household budget set in this case is depicted in Figure
1. In The Netherlands, this budget set is a reasonable approximation for
families not entitled to unemployment benefits. If, for example, the optimal
number of the husband's working hours is at a kink, then female labor supply
is not given by (2) but by the conditional labor supply function given in
Section 2.4.
If the budget set is non-convex, comparison of values of the direct
utility function is necessary to determine the optimum, as is described in
Section 2.3. Unemployment benefits or fixed costs of working are common pheno-
mena causing such non-convexities, in particular at zero hours of work.9
Figure 1. The household budget set if individual budget sets are
piecewise linear and convex
Apart from constraints arising from the shape of the budget set,
restrictions may stem from demand side factors or institutional constraints on
the labor market. Particularly in The Netherlands, actual hours are not only
determined by labor supply decisions of the household, but also strongly
depend on ínstitutional constraints, such as agreements between unions end
employers, and demand side factors. Most jobs in The Netherlands are 40 hours
a week jobs, with a fixed number of holidays and strong limitations on working
overtime. Especially in the manufacturing sector, there are only a limited
number of part-time jobs. Possibilities to work a non-standard number of hours
are rare. It therefore seems unrealistic to treat actual hours as if they were
chosen freely by the membersof the family.
This is one of the reasons why several recent Dutch labor market
surveys do not only contain information on actual hours worked, but also on
preferred hours, i.e. the number of hours someone would like to work under a
given scenario. Although the description of such a hypothetical scenario is
never complete, the formulation of the questions in the most recent surveys
seems to leave practically no room for misinterpretation. Preferred hours are
provided by respondents in a ceteris paribus context, i.e. it is assumed that
the partner does not change his or her actual number of working hours. This10
way of questioning implies, that preferred hours in the data set are to be
interpreted as optimel hours, condítional on the fact that the actuel number
of hours worked by the partner is flxed.~) Thus, a conditional labor supply
equation as described in Section 2.4 is needed to explain preferred hours.
Some further explanation may be useful at this point. Of course,
preferred hours are not very interesting by themselves from an economist's
point of view; it is actual hours that we want to study eventually. But, due
to institutional constraints and demand side factors, preferred hours appear
to be a better reflection of the household's preferences then actusl hours.
Thus, certainly in The Netherlands, it is preferred hours we should use to
reveal preferences. In a later stage, the information on family preferences
should be used to construct a labor market model, in which actual hours are
linked to preferences and institutional constraints and demand side factors.
4. An empirical example
In this section, we present an application of the model studied in
Section 2. A similar model, estimated for a different data set, can be found
in Kapteyn ~ Woíttiez (1988). In that paper, some of the results derived here
have been used. For the rest, the Kapteyn ~ Woittiez paper concentrates on
different issues, particularly habit formation and preference interdependence.
In our model preferred hours of husband and wife are the endogenous variables,
for reasons discussed in Section 3.
4.1. Specification of the model
Since each individual provides his or her preferred number of working
hours, taking the partner's actual labor supply as given, only conditional
labor supply functions are relevant. From the individusl's point of view the
household budget-set is therefore only two-dimensional. In Figures 2a end 2b,
approximate budget sets are drawn for a female, whose husband works hm hours a
week.
-------------------------------------------------------
3) A typical wording of the survey question asking for preferred hours is:
"How many hours would you like to work if you could choose freely and if your
hourly after tax wage rate remains as it is now? Assume that other family
members do not change their number of working hours"11
Figure 2a relates to a working female. The budget curve consists of 11
income tax brackets. Non-convexities do not arise, because working people who
quit voluntarily are not entitled to unemployment benefits. The optimal number
of hours in this case can be found by computing conditional labor supply for
each of the brackets, as described by Hausman (1979) and Blomquist (1983).
since fixing male labor supply has reduced the dimension of the problem. The
optimum hf can be in the interior of one of the brackets or at one of the
kinks, as in the situation drawn. It may also be negative.
If a female is unemployed and receives benefits cf~0, the budget set
is non-convex. We assume, that the individual looses all benefits at the
moment she works slightly more than zero hours. This assumption is in itself
incorrect, but since the marginal tax rate on increased earnings for someone
on unemployment compensation is close to 100x, so that a choice of a number of
hours corresponding with en earned income below the unemployment benefit level
is unlikely, it appears to be rather harmless.
The optimum in this case (see Figure 2b) cen be either 0 hours or hf, depend-
ing on the fact whether the utility level UO-U(hm,0,utmhmtcf) exceeds
U1-U(hm,max(O,hf),Htwmmtwf,ma~c(O,hf)) or not. (In Figure 2b, the former is the
case).
Y
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Figure 2a. The budget set; no Figure Zb. The budget set with
une~ploy~ent benefits ~u~rploy~ent banefíta
The stochastic specification in utility rationing models is a delicate
problem, even in the case of a convex budget set (see, e.g., Kooreman and
Kapteyn (1986)). In these types of models it is important to distinguish12
between different sources of random errors, i. e. measurement errors,
optimization errors and random preferences.
Preference variation across households in our model could be incorpo-
rated by allowing the parameters Sm and bf to depend upon household characte-
ristics:
K
bi- i x.bi.t Ei (i-m~f)
j-1 J J
(21)
where xj (j-1,...,K) are observed characteristics (including a constant term)
and ei is a random variable representing unobserved sources of preference
variation. This corresponds to translating, see McElroy (1987)
Random b's, however, lead to random shadow wages and a complicated
likelihood function. Moreover, the lack of global concavity, as discussed in
Section 2.2, implies that it is necessary to truncate the distribution of the
e's in some rather intricate way. It is easy to see that conditions like (3')
or (12) imply that the e's have to lie in a polyhedron and it is hard to find
a tractable distribution which allows for such a kind of truncation. Although
we do recognize the importance of a stochastic specification that allows for
random preference variation, the ensuing complications make this an issue
beyond the scope of this paper.
Our stochastic specification is "ad hoc" 1n the sense, that it only
allows for optimization (or measurement) errors. We add normally distributed
error terms to the conditional labor supply functions.
Thus, for a female not receiving an unemployment compensation, we have
hf- max{0, hff ef}
w
where hf is the observed preferred number of working hours and hf is the
optimal choice given the budget constraint.4)
If a female does receive an unemployment compensation, we only know
whether she is seriously looking for a job or not. The optimization error
is incorporated as an error in the "regime choice":
v - ul- u~t nf.
-------------------------------------------------------
nf
3) For individuals who work less than 15 hours a week, it is only known
whether preferred hours exceed actual hours or not. It is straightforward
to take this into account, considering hp as a latent variable.13
Zf v)0, the Female wants to work; if v(0, she is not seriously looking for a
job. Male preferred labor supply is treated in exactly the same way.
The vector of error terms (ef, Em, nm, ~f)' is assumed to follow a
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An asterisk indicates that the variance does not appear in the likelihood
function, so that it cannot be estimated. Because of the small number of
people in the sample receiving an unemployment benefit, we impose cov(em'~f) -
cov(ef,nm) - 0, and var(nm) - var(nf).
4.2. Date and estimation results
The data used stem from a labor mobility survey conducted in The
Netherlands in 1982 by the Institute of Social Research of Tilburg University
jointly with the Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics. The data set has
been used by various researchers in The Netherlands for studies on labor
supply, labor mobility, and income distribution. The survey was held among a
random sample of Dutch households with at least one household member between
16 and 65 years of age. In each household, all members between 16 and 65 years
have been interviewed. The information collected pertains to incomes, hours
worked, desired hours, search behavior, demographics, etc. Non-response is
equsl to 35.7 X. Comparison with population characteristics shows that the
survey is fairly representative of the population from which it was drawn,
elthough students and unemployed people appear to be somewhat
underrepresented. Altogether the survey comprises 26~~ persons in 1299
households. The analysis here is restricted to families with at least two
adults. Also, self-employed, students, and disabled people are omitted from
the semple. As a result, in the estimation of the household labor suppiy
model, data on 520 households were used. Some semple statistics are given in
Table 1.
The before tax wage rates in Table 1 are predicted wages on the basis
of a wage equation with log(age), log(age)-squared and education as14
predictors. For males and females separate wage equations have been estímated,
using Heckman's two-stage procedure (Heckman (1979)).
Table 1. Sample Statistics
mean standard min max number
deviation of obs.
males preferred hours 37.60 6.62 15 70 489
actual hours ( all males) 39.77 11.78 0 70 520
actual hours ( working
males only) 42.29 6.38 20 70 489
before tax wage rate 14.97 7.66 4.98 55.87 520
after tax wage rate 11.74 3.72 4.95 29.48 520
unemployment benefit 357.70 96.40 228.99 644.38 26
(recipients only)
females preferred hours 24.49 8.52 8 50 133
actual hours (all
females) 8.44 13.24 0 42 510
actual hours (working
females only) 22.62 12.20 2 42 194
before tax wage rate 14.18 5.72 3-41 23.26 520
after tax wage rate 12.71 5.12 3.06 21.82 520
unemployment benefits
(recipients only) 132.33 71.59 50.83 184.11 3
non-labor household income 80.62 122.54 0 927.41 520
log (family size) 1.200 0.349 0.693 2.303 520
dummy children ( 6 years old o.317 0.466 0 1 520
Eacplanation:
hours: working hours per week
wage rates: in Dfl. per hour worked
benefits: in Dfl. per week
non-labor income: in Dfl. per week, not including unemployment benefits.15
Table 2. Estimation results
Parameter Estimate Standard error5)
a 0.88 x 10-3 0.13 x 10-2
s -0.20 x 10-2 0.10 x 10-2
m











sf -0.47 x 10-3 0.47 x l0-3
f
6 21.4 x 1010 32.5 x 1011
v
p -0.21 0.07
o -390.18 - 6)
Explanation: the parameters bm and bf have been made dependent upon additional
exogenous variables as follows:
2




X-{1 if there are children in the family younger than six
2 0 otherwise
-------------------------------------------------------
5) Covariance matrix of the parameter estimates is estimated as outer product.
6) The estimate of B attains its upper bound (due to the imposition of conca-
vity) so no standard error could be computed.16
The model has been estimated by means of maximum likelihood.~) To impose
concavity of the cost function in wages in a relevant region of the (hm,hf,y)-
SpaCP., Lhe parameter 8 has been restricted, i.e. an upper bound in terms of
other parameters in the model has been set to 8, such that concavity is
guaranteed in all data points8j; it turns out that this restriction is
binding. It should be noted that testing of the restriction is impossible,
since Lhe likelihood is not well-defined under the alternative. This problem
is discussed in more deLail in Van SoesL et el. (1988).
Table 2 presents the parameter estimates. pm ("the male non-labor income
effect") is significantly negative and ,yf ( representing the largest part of
the female own wage effect) is significantly positive, whereas gf, a and ym do
not differ significantly from zero. pm and Sf have the expected sign, indi-
cating that leisure is a normal good. The variables concerning family composi-
tion play a significant role in the female hours equation but not in the male
hours equation. A direct economic interpretation for the parameters other than
Sm and ~Sf is hard to give. The economic meaning of the estimates is brought
out more clearly by graphs and elasticities.
In Figures 3 a through d family labor supply functions are drawn for a
family without children as a function of before tax wage rates. In each case
the remaining variables are set at their sample means. We distinguish between
"short run" (the partner is rationed at a certaín number of hours) and "long
run" (the partner is not rationed) labor supply functions. In each of the four
figures two short run labor supply functions are drawn: one for the case where
the actual number of hours worked by the partner equals the sample mean (hf -
~) A table with likelihood contributions is available on request. The
likelihood contributions vary according to whether one or two spouses are
participating, whether or not the budget set is convex, whether or not
preferred hours are zero, etc.
8) For a positive definite matrix A, concavity is equivalent to (3').
Substituting (19) and (18) into (3') yields
9 ~-{u,h w fb w,ly w2} . 1~-1(b -h taw )2- ló-lAZÍA'A-1P)-2i (R'A-1P)-1.
- m m f f 2 f f 2 m m m f 2 m m
This restriction - and a similar one for male labor supply - has been
imposed for all sample observations.22.62 or hm - 42.29) and one for the case where the partner does not work at
all.
Figure 3a shows a backward bending male labor supply function implying
that the negative income effect dominates the positive own wage effect. Fi-
gures 3b and 3c reveal the expected negative relationship between one's
preferred number of hours and the partner's wage rate, but the effects are
small. Figure 3d shows that female labor supply is forward bending. The own
wage impact is much larger for the wife than for the husband. Figure 3d also
reveals the working of the tax system. The piece-wise linear progressive tax
system leads to jig-sawed responses of preferred hours to the own before-tax
wage rate. The reason for this is that each time an individual is at a kink in
the budget constraint, she wants to stay there if change the before-tax wage
rate changes a little bit. To stay at a kink with an increasing before-tax
wage rate entails a reduction of work effort. The downward sloping parts in
Figure 3d are hence hyperbolas. The same kind of non-differentiabilities is in
principle also present in Figure 3a, but in this case the hyperbola parts are
so small that the drawing cannot reveal them. This is caused by the very small
male own wage effect.
The difference in own wage elasticities is borne out by Figure 4 in
which some indifference curves are depicted, using the results of Section 2.3.
Figure 4a shows a few indifference curves upon which the husband's decision is
based if his wife works hf - 22.62 hours; it is easy to see that a change in
the male wage rate only has a small impact on the optimal number of male
working hours. In Figure 4b, where the wife's índifference curves are drawn if
the husband works h- 42.29 hours a week, the (own) wage impact is much
m
larger (Note the difference in scale of' both figures).
Similar figures could be drawn for different family compositions. The
main difference would be e strong downward shift in all female labor supply
functions (due to the negative estimates for bfl and bf2, the parameters that
represent the impact of family size and the presence of children younger than
six respectively on the wife's labor supply). As a result (predicted) prefer-
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Figure 3. Preferred hours as a function of before tax hourly ~ rates
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Figure 4. Some indifference curves for s family without children if the
number of working hours of one spouse are fixed.5. Conclusions
Consistent modelling of household labor supply under different regimes
(i.e. for different kinks and corners) requires the use of shadow prices if
one wants to work with specifications that are given in dual form.
Unfortunately, most of the known flexible forms have the undesirable property
that shadow prices cannot be found in closed form, except for some special
cases. It appears that the only reasonably flexible forms which allow for the
computation of shadow wages in closed form are the direct quadratic utility
function and the Hausman-Ruud specification. Of course, knowing shadow prices
for any point ~mounts to knowing the direct uti.lity function. Indeed the fir~st
thing accomplished in this paper is the derivation of the direct utility
function corresponding to the Hausman-Ruud specification. Secondly, the
application of rationing theory requires that the system considered satisfies
the Slutsky conditions in all data points. Hence we have imposed concavity
conditions for all data points in the empirical example considered.
The obvious advantage of the joint modelling of labor supply of both
spouses in a family is that once the preferences are known (have been
estimated) we are able to predict household behavior under different regimes.
This is impossible, for example, if female labor supply were modelled without
taking into account the interaction of husband and wife. In the latter case it
would be impossible to say what would happen if the male changes the number of
hours worked, or changes from a state of unemployment to a state of
employment. It is true that the pictures in Figure 4 suggest that actually not
much will happen in such a case, but of course one can only know that after an
empirical analysis in which the interaction of both spouses has been taken
into account properly.
A drawback of the Hausman-Ruud specification might seem to be that it is
difficult to allow for random preferences in a utility consistent way. At
first sight the direct quadratic utility function does not suffer from such a
problem. Ransom (1987b) presents a specification with random errors and
provides conditions under which the ensuing model is coherent. The conditions
are easy to impose and estimation of the model by ML is rather
straightforward. It turns out however that for certain values of the random
preferences the bliss point of the direct quadratic utility function is insidezo
the budget constraint, and in such a case the demand equations do not
represent a utility maximum. We have shown elsewhere (Van Soest, Kooreman, and
Kapteyn (1988}), that the restrictions on the random preferences which are
required to prevent this from happening are identical to the restrictions that
have to be imposed in the Hausman-Ruud system on the random preferences to
guarantee a well-behaved system. Therefore, there are no compelling a priori
reasons to prefer one system or the other; we have two reasonably tractable
flexible sytems available which can be used for the analysis of household
labor supply in the presence oF kinks and corners, and the choice between them
in each case should be based on the data at hand.
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